报告题目: Alliance Formation Among Competitors

　　报告时间：2020年10月30日（星期五）19:00—20:30

　　报告地点：腾讯会议 ID：615 739 921

　　（会议链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/s/8JinxZ4c6wIg）

　　报告人：吴肖乐  复旦大学管理学院  教授

　　主讲人简介：

　　吴肖乐，复旦大学管理学院教授、博士生导师。2016年国家优秀青年科学基金项目获得者，2020年国家杰出青年科学基金项目获得者。2006年本科毕业于清华大学工业工程系，2011年博士毕业于圣路易斯华盛顿大学。主要研究供应链管理、风险管理、可持续性运营问题。其研究工作发表于Management Science, MSOM，POM 等顶级期刊。曾获中国管理学青年奖（2017）、华人学者管理科学与工程协会最佳论文一等奖（2011）、2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。入选上海市曙光人才计划（2016）、上海市教育系统巾帼建功标兵（2020）。目前担任顶级期刊POM 的Senior Editor、Service Science 和Modern Supply Chain Research and Applications 的Associate Editor。

　　Abstract：We study potential alliance formation among three competing firms with asymmetric capacity: one large firm has ample capacity, and two small firms have limited capacity. Each firm can either operate independently or form an alliance with another firm.  Due to antitrust laws, an alliance of all three firms is not permitted. We first derive and compare equilibrium profits for different alliance structures in the base model where the size of loyal buyers for different firms is symmetric. By considering a standard equilibrium concept, we find that either no alliance will be formed or the large firm will form a ''mixed'' alliance with a small firm under conditions pertaining to the sizes of each firm’s capacity and loyal buyers. We explain how the equilibrium alliance structure is driven by the “price effect”and the “demand effect”. We also extend our base model to the case when the large firm has more loyal buyers than the small ones, and show that our structural results remain the same even though a ''small'' alliance with two small firms can emerge as the dominant alliance structure in some occasions.